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ALMOST ten years after it was initiated, evidence as to the
contribution the Reform has made so far to increasing the effi-
ciency of the Soviet economy and the rate of growth of GNP is
still inconclusive; this is particularly true of the financial aspects
of the Reform, which alone concern us here. In assessing the
economic growth of the Soviet economy since 1965 in its various
significant aspects. (such as the relatively more rapid improvement
in consumer well-being), it is well-nigh impossible to disentangle
the influence of measures considered part of the Reform from
those that are, in essence, the continuation of policies initiated
several years earlier, many of which are associated with the name
of Khrushchev. These include the monetization of kolkhoz opera-
tions, greater emphasis on progressive technology, a minimum
income for farmers and higher minimum wages for workers,
greater emphasis on housing and managerial training, and greater
mobility of the labor force.
The direct effects of the Reform on labor productivity, unit
costs, profitability, and the distribution of the social product are
obscured by changes in the computation and presentation of
official basic data, and by lack of information as to which of the
new rules and policies are actually being implemented. There is
evidence that outward compliance has not been accompanied by
significant changes in old ways, and that postponement or suspen-
sion of the new system has resulted in considerable differences
among industries. In many cases, the general principles of the
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requirements of individual industries, product lines, and eco- been the subje
nomic administrations and regions. pers, and jouri
By the time the twenty-fourth Communist Party Congress was The fact that
held in March 1971, the term "economic reform" had nearly more importan
vanished from the scene.1 Subsequently, certain measures were the economic i
taken that actually represent a back-sliding from the Reform: represent a
additional targets ("directive indicators") were reintroduced financial incent
(such as labor productivity targets at the enterprise level and tral authorities
experimental targets for wage cost per unit of output, authorized than "norms"
by individual ministries and republic authorities), and the progres- with the same
sivity of payment schedules for bonuses was reduced. Some inadequate inc
important measures, initially announced as an integral part of the Greater ava
Reform, were never put into effect, while others were introduced essential condi
only partially. Alongside all this, however, some measures are ment decisions
being passed from time to time that are designed to implement raise enough ii
various aspects of the original reforms. Instead of simplifying the there is no
workings of the economy, the Reform, by superimposing new greater influen
rules on a system that retained its basic structure, merely added time lag betwe
to its complexity. Fear of the consequences of departures from The Reforni
familiar routine and uncertainty about the effects of the new financial incer
arrangements on output, productivity, availability of inputs, and efforts to intro4
disposal of outputs—as well as concern about their authority and has been ident
relationship with supervisory bodies—caused many enterprise improving the
directors to take a wait-and-see attitude and to actually resist decentralizatio
change, covertly and even openly. interest by mi
It is abundantly clear that resistance and downright sabotage by introduction 0:
bureaucrats, believing themselves threatened by the changes and machinery.
the complexity of the changes introduced in the financial mecha- Failure to
nism, has caused considerable confusion. By and large, these prices as a res
changes were inadequately prepared for. Where room was left for various chang
interpretation and adaptation, the Reform resulted in a variety of marginal pricii
combinations of the old and the new. Additional rules, norms, and steering the ec
techniques were frequently added to, rather than substituted for, intentions of
what existed before. Ever since the inception of the Reform, the while produce
best ways of introducing the new financial techniques and of
adapting them to specific conditions in individual industries have 2See, for instanc
his critical comment
(Socialist Industry),
'See Grossman in Dodge [112] and [238] and Schroeder [249] and [251]. See also J.E.C. On the introduct
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been the subject of discussion in meetings, conferences, newspa-
pers, and journals.
The fact that money flows, credit, and interest rates now play a
more important role than before the Reform in oiling the wheels of
the economic machine to increase its efficiency does not in itself
represent a significant change. Nor does the new emphasis on
financial incentives necessarily reduce interference from the cen-
tral authorities. "Financial levers" can be manipulated no less
than "norms" or other physical ratios, constraints, and targets—
with the same potential for misallocating resources and offering
inadequate incentives.
Greater availability of retained funds and bank credit is an
essential condition of, but no guarantee for, decentralizing invest-
ment decisions. The main problem of socialist economies is not to
raise enough investment financing but to optimize its use. So far
there is no evidence that enterprises have been able to exert
greater influence on the patterns of investment and to reduce the
time lag between the inception and the completion of a project.
The Reform has failed in its central objective—to provide
financial incentives powerful enough to maximiie enterprise
efforts to introduce advanced technology. This is important, for it
has been identified by proponents of the Reform2 as essential for
improving the performance of the Soviet economy, together with
decentralization of research and development and heightened
interest by ministries and other supervisory authorities in the
introduction of new technological processes and more advanced
machinery.
Failure to come to grips with the central problem of the role of
prices as a resource allocator has limited the significance of the
various changes introduced under the Reform. The postulate of
marginal pricing and clearing the market may not be adequate for
steering the economy in a direction that would conform with the
intentions of the responsible politicalauthorities. However,
while producers need not be guided by prices alone, planners
2See,. for instance, V. Trapenznikov's important article in Pravda in August 1964 and
his critical comments on the failings of the Reform in Sotsialisticheskaya Promychienost'
(Socialist Industry), December 3, 1970.
On the introduction in July 1971 of specific sales targets for technologically advanced
items in individual enterprises see earlier discussion.186 The Reform Ten Years Later
must be ready to accept existing price relationships as sufficiently emphasized cc
realistic to provide a basis for rational decisions. Adjustments in his suppliers a.
the price structure stemming from the Reform have attempted to delivery dates
make demand enter the process of price formation, but have specifications
nevertheless been made bureaucratically. of the intendec
There is little evidence to suggest that the new "financial intermediate p
levers" operate as market allocators rather than merely as substi- some degree o
tutes for orders from the planning center. An interest-free loan (or Administrat
loan proffered at a preferential rate) may be a sugar-coated order; operated on a
can the director afford not to take it without having to face up to on the
"public criticism"? A considerable number of arrangements problems of o
under the new system provide opportunities for continuing The most iml
administrative interference, such as setting differentiated capital creation of lai
charge and depreciation rates. Actual experience so far suggests (ob'edineniye)
that survival of administrative controls has interferred with the organizational
play of "financial levers," which in many cases operate merely as smaller sociali
auxiliary mechanisms of the command economy.3 operating unit
The use of some indicator of profitability as a guide for structur- present subdii
ing output and making investment decisions is important, whether ress toward ti
such decisions are made by the central authorities or by the made so far.
enterprise. But a significant improvement in enterprise efficiency The empha
is likely to require greater enterprise autonomy in the disposition less wasteful i
of profits than has been in evidence. Only to the extent that the be viewed in
profit level significantly and directly benefits them will the individ- results in this
ual enterprise and its staff have sufficient incentive to maximize unresponsive 1
profits as contrasted with meeting profit targets. an optimal au
There is little evidence that this has been a significant result of that of anothe
the modest restructuring of financial flows. The enterprise direc- Is somethit
tor is still far from being a quasi entrepreneur, although he has rather than
somewhat more latitude than before in planning as well as in day- financial flows
by-day operations. By restructuring production in favor of sella- though an ans
ble items with the largest profit margin, he can attempt to increase developments
profits beyond what they would be solely on the basis of produc- Bank as a fim
tivity gains and enlarged volume, provided he is not exceeding the butes of a cen
limits imposed from the outside. He is not free to set prices for his role in
output, or to choose among substitutable inputs. The much- to credit incr
profitability, ii
31t is significant that in explaining the benefits of the new system, authorities emphasize of its manage that it will help to "disclose" hidden reserves, which apparently escape detection through .
theexistent systems of financial and other controls. permitted conThe Reform Ten Years 187
emphasized contractual relationships he is free to establish with
his suppliers are, in fact, limited to a spelling out of such details as
delivery dates, since sources of supply, quantities, and general
specifications of inputs are determined by outside agencies. Few
of the intended changes in supply arrangements for raw materials,
intermediate products, and capital goods, designed to introduce
some degree of flexibility, have been implemented.
Administrative economic agencies (such as glavks) are still not
operated on a business accounting basis. In spite of the emphasis
on the managerial aspects of the Reform, most of the main
problems of optimal industrial organization remain unresolved.
The most important single change since the Reform was the
creation of large horizontal or vertical groupings of enterprises
(ob'edineniye). It is uncertain whether such larger groupings (an
organizational form that has become important in several of the
smaller socialist countries) retaining the enterprise as the basic
operating unit will be more than administrative substitutes for the
present subdivisions of industrial ministries. Only modest prog-
ress toward the creation of such larger operating units has been
made so far.
The emphasis on money and the role of credit in achieving a
less wasteful use of resources on the microeconomic level must
be viewed in the light of past failures to achieve satisfactory
results in this area. As long as interest rates remain rigid and
unresponsive to either demand or supply, their role in achieving
an optimal allocation of resources is likely to remain essentially
that of another administratively determined variable.
Is something identifiable as a "socialist monetary policy,"
rather than merely an improved use of credit and rechanneling of
financial flows, about to emerge as a result of the Reform? Even
though an answer still cannot be hazarded, it appears that the new
developments are more likely to enhance the role of the State
Bank as a financial intermediary than to endow it with the attri-
butes of a central bank in the Western sense, or give it a greater
role in managing aggregate demand. At best they will make access
to credit increasingly dependent on the individual enterprise's
profitability, its balance sheet, and, indirectly at least, the quality
of its management. But even if the monobanker is ultimately
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the Reform in dealing with microeconomic problems, thereby Reform to this
becoming a more efficient commercial and investment banker, objectives isj
this would not necessarily entail a basic change in the role of rather than opt
banking and the credit system. Because of I
So far the "new system of economic steering" has gone little 1968 measures
beyond giving formal recognition to money as an agent of eco- was modest as
nomic activity. It has not assigned to money any precise new tional years be
functions. Hardly anything has been done beyond legitimatizing and those that
the role of money as a result of a tedious discussion on the sion emerges
"goods-money relationship." The role assigned to money may eighth Five-Ye
change if the relative weights attached to the plan and to the drawing to its e
market in the new scheme of things shift in favor of the second, in agricultural
even if market processes and feedbacks are still limited to the significant con
consumption sector. It would lea
Is there room in the reformed economy for a specific socialist reasons why ti
monetary and financial policy, as distinguished from monetary cautious polith
planning? What is the precise role of money in the new system of bureaucrats wi
economic guidance? To what extent are money flows to guide complex and—
rather than merely to reflect real flows? And how is the shift from means related
the control function to an allocative and incentive function to be
accomplished? Will the role of money be enlarged from microfi-
nancial controls to a macroeconomic tool?
In order to acquire a market function, money must become a
true "bearer of options" in the production as well as in the
household sector. The transformation of passive into active
money hinges on a number of factors. A price, system balancing
demand and supply and reflecting relative scarcities and substitu-
tion options is the sine qua non of such a system; without it,
maximization of profits cannot serve as a guide to enterprise
behavior, and domestic prices cannot guide foreign trade. Money
must acquire a bigger role in emitting directional signals to pro-
duction. This requires a unification of money in domestic uses.
To sum up: ten years after it was launched, it still is uncertain to
what extent Reform has improved the functioning and effective-
ness of the Soviet economy. The problem of optimizing the use of
resources, tackled even before the Reform by Soviet policy mak-
ers from various angles (for the economy as a whole, for individ-
ual branches like power and transportation, and for individual
industries like coal), remains unsolved. The contribution of the
Jblems, thereby
stment banker,
in the role of
has gone little
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Reform to this problem has been minor, since one of its primary
objectives is increasing the efficiency of existing investment
rather than optimization of new investment.
Because of its limited scope (compared, for example, to the
1968 measures in Hungary), the immediate impact of the Reform
was modest as is evident from comparisons made in the transi-
tional years between enterprises that shifted to the new system
and those that continued under the old rules. The same conclu-
sion emerges when considering the overall achievements of the
eighth Five-Year Plan (1966—1970) and of the ninth Plan, which is
drawing to its end, although bad weather and the resultant decline
in agricultural production, still basic to the Soviet economy, were
significant contributing factors.
It would lead us beyond the scope of this study to probe into the
reasons why the Soviet Reform was begun so haif-heartedly by
cautious politicians and was later almost stopped in its tracks by
bureaucrats who felt threatened by the changes. The reasons are
complex and—like everything else in the Soviet Union—by no
means related primarily to economic considerations.